

Ten Ways to Dodge CyberBullets

David Harley, BA FBCS CITP CISSP



Table of Contents

Introduction	3
1. Don't let AutoRun be AutoInfect	4
2. Catch the patch batch	6
3. Do you need administrative privileges?	7
4. Good password practice	8
5. Trust people, not addresses	9
6. Social networks can be very anti-social	10
7. Call for backup	11
8. Antivirus isn't total security	12
9. Be wireless, not careless	13
10. Don't be a crackhead	14

Introduction

Around New Year it seems that everyone wants a top 10: the top 10 most stupid remarks made by celebrities, the 10 worst-dressed French poodles, the 10 most embarrassing political speeches and so on. We revisited some of the ideas that our Research team at ESET, LLC came up with at the end of 2008 for a “top 10 things that people can do to protect themselves against malicious activity.” While much of the content in this paper comes from a series of blogs from the beginning of 2009 and based on that material, it’s been updated here with more recent material from other members of ESET’s research teams across the globe.

1. Don't let AutoRun be AutoInfect

In other words, disable AutoRun in Windows. This is the item that we pretty much all agreed should be top of the list, because this facility is consistently exploited by the class of malware ESET detects as INF/Autorun. Among other threats, of course: many threats that are detected by more specific names (some versions of Win32/Conficker, for example) make use of the same vulnerability. We've been considering this issue in detail for a good while now: for instance, in Randy Abrams' blog at <http://www.eset.com/threat-center/blog/?p=94>.

That class of malware has been consistently at or near the top of our monthly worldwide top 10 reported threats as long as I've been tracking them. Don't assume, though, that this single precaution will save you from every example of this type of threat. Most malware uses more than one technique to infect targeted systems.

Windows 7's departure from the much misused AutoRun feature will contribute to a gradual decline in INF/Autorun and related threats.

Here's the description of INF/Autorun based on the one we use currently in our monthly threat reports:

This detection label is used to describe a variety of malware using the file autorun.inf as a way of compromising a PC. This file contains information on programs meant to run automatically when removable media (often USB flash drives and similar devices) are accessed by a Windows PC user. ESET security software heuristically identifies malware that installs or modifies autorun.inf files as INF/Autorun, unless it is identified as a member of a specific malware family.

What does this mean for the end user?

Removable devices are useful and very popular. Of course, malware authors are well aware of this, as INF/Autorun's frequent return to the number one spot clearly indicates. Here's why it's a problem.

The default AutoRun setting in Windows (though not Windows 7) will automatically run a program listed in the autorun.inf file when you access many kinds of removable media. There are many types of malware that copy themselves to removable storage devices. While this isn't always the program's primary distribution mechanism, malware authors are always ready to build in a little extra "value" by including an additional infection technique.

While using this mechanism can make it easy to spot for a scanner that uses this heuristic, it's better, as Randy Abrams has suggested in our blog (<http://www.eset.com/threat-center/blog/?p=94>; <http://www.eset.com/threat-center/blog/?p=828>) to disable the AutoRun function by default, rather than to rely on antivirus to detect it in every case.

As Randy Abrams later pointed out in a blog at <http://www.eset.com/threat-center/blog/2009/08/25/now-you-can-fix-autorun>, Microsoft has released the patches required to make AutoRun work with only CD and DVD drives. There is one little catch: A USB drive can be configured to look like a CD, but this patch definitely helps reduce risk.

Randy recommends that you install the patch so that you can connect most thumb drives, GPS systems, digital picture frames and other USB devices with storage to your computer safely.

For Windows XP users, the patch is at:

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=96ca61f6-8b16-4157-9635-8cfc0bbf4c35#tm>

For Windows Vista users, the patch is at:

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=dd6a61a3-b3c6-4b0a-a848-7b32be9f31c5>

For Windows Vista 64 bit users, the patch is at:

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=12e3fe0f-db79-4a27-aa7d-a456ee1c6ac4>

For Windows Server 2003 users, the patch is at:

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=b8df9256-cbb0-418d-a336-d29dc4415a65>

For Windows Server 2003 64 bit users, the patch is at:

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=b8df9256-cbb0-418d-a336-d29dc4415a65>

For Windows Server 2003 Itanium users, the patch is at:

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=5a21cbb8-da7b-42e0-924b-485950e7de52>

For Windows Server 2008 users, the patch is at:

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=9c404a99-537f-4fee-874d-e50fd6efea3b>

For Windows Server 2008 64 bit users, the patch is at:

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=d43a9947-f0e0-47dc-9dad-5c8942a3cc91>

For users of Windows Server 2008 Itanium systems, the patch is at:

<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=cfb9c98c5-3ba5-4164-83e0-9397e2722ea0>

2. Catch the patch batch

Keep applications and operating system components up to date with automated updates and patches, and by regularly reviewing the vendors' product update sections on their web sites.

This point is particularly relevant right now, given the continuing volumes of Conficker that we're continuing to see. Win32/Conficker is a network worm that propagates by exploiting a vulnerability in the Windows operating system (MS08-67). The vulnerability is present in the RPC subsystem and can be exploited remotely by an attacker. The attacker can perform his attack without valid user credentials. While ESET has effective detection for Conficker, it's important for end users to ensure that their systems are updated with the Microsoft patch, which has been available since the end of October, so as to avoid other threats using the same vulnerability. Information on the vulnerability itself is available at: <http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/ms08-067.msp>.

While later variants dropped the code for infecting via AutoRun, it can't hurt to disable it. This will reduce the impact of the many threats we detect as INF/Autorun, as described above. The Research team in San Diego has blogged extensively on Conficker issues: <http://www.eset.com/threat-center/blog/?cat=145>.

It's important to note that it's possible to avoid most Conficker infection risks generically by practicing "safe hex". Keep up to date with system patches, disable AutoRun and don't use unsecured shared folders. In view of all the publicity Conficker has received, and its extensive use of a vulnerability that's been remediable for so many months, we'd expect Conficker infections to be in decline by now if people were taking these commonsense precautions, but clearly it isn't happening.

Sometimes it seems that the whole world assumes that the only vendor that suffers from vulnerabilities in its operating system and other software is Microsoft. To see how misleading claims like this can be, check out the weekly "Consensus Security Vulnerability Alert" published by SANS (see <http://portal.sans.org>), which summarizes some of the most important vulnerabilities and exploits identified in the preceding week. Even during a week that includes "Patch Tuesday," you'll typically find that problems are flagged with a frightening number of applications from other vendors. Certainly, any system administrator should consider making use of this resource.

At the moment, vulnerabilities in applications are a serious threat (arguably more so than operating system vulnerabilities). Third-party applications are expected to continue to bear the brunt of vulnerability attacks for a good while yet, as security improvements in operating systems will continue to drive vulnerability research to applications like Safari, iTunes, Adobe Flash, Adobe Reader, many IM clients and other applications.

Unfortunately, users are far less savvy about patching third-party applications than they are about patching the operating system. However, this vector will also decline in impact as application vendors learn to tighten their quality control and patching methodologies. Part of this will be driven by adoption of Windows 7. Computers originally sold with Windows XP, with a few exceptions (such as newer netbooks), are beginning to age and will be replaced with PCs that have Windows 7. The newer operating system's move away from the misconceived, much misused AutoRun facility will hopefully contribute to a gradual decline in INF/Autorun and related threats.

3. Do you need administrative privileges?

Log on to your computer with an account that doesn't have "Administrator" privileges to reduce the likelihood and severity of damage from self-installing malware. Multiuser operating systems (and nowadays, few operating systems assume that a machine will be used by a single user at a single level of privilege) allow you to create an account for everyday use that allows you less privileges than are available to an administrator.

Most competent system administrators are familiar with (and adhere to) this "principle of least privilege" – simplistically, the more privileges you have as a user, the more damage you can do – and use a privileged account only when it is needed to perform a specific task. Following their lead will give an extra layer of protection. However, as always, you shouldn't think of this as any sort of Magic Bullet. Apart from the fact that there is no Magic Bullet, some modern operating systems have somewhat diluted the least-privilege model, making it rather easy for a user with little knowledge of the security implications of administrative privilege to use it inappropriately, exposing the system to threat.

4. Good password practice

Use different passwords for your computer and online services. Also, it's good practice to change passwords on a regular basis and avoid simple passwords, especially those that are easily guessed.

It's debatable whether enforced, frequent changes of hard-to-remember passwords are always constructive (they can force the user to write down passwords, for example, which may well swap one security problem for another).

However, you should certainly be aware that if some miscreant guesses or cracks one of your passwords, using different passwords for other services and for your system passwords drastically limits the damage that he or she can do. If, on the other hand, you use the same password for different accounts, you run the risk that one lucky guess will give the cracker the keys to the kingdom. Indeed, it's likely that one of the reasons that quite trivial accounts are sometimes phished is that they give a cracker a head start on guessing the password for other, more profitable and more easily plundered accounts.

You might find this paper on good password practice useful: <http://www.eset.com/download/whitepapers/EsetWP-KeepingSecrets20090814.pdf>

5. Trust people, not addresses

Don't trust unsolicited files or embedded links, even from friends.

It's easy to spoof email addresses, for instance, so that email appears to come from someone other than the real sender (who/which may in any case be a spam tool rather than a human being). Basic SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) doesn't validate the sender's address in the "From" field, though well-secured mail services do often include such functionality.

I remember years ago one of my colleagues at a medical research charity in the UK sent email as a joke using someone else's address, a trick that's easily performed using telnet and an unsecured mail server, especially when you're on the same network. On that occasion, I was able to identify the real sender immediately by his IP address (much to his surprise), but the nature of the 21st century Internet means that there are many ways of concealing such information, if you really want to stay hidden.

It's also possible for mail to be sent from your account, without your knowledge, by malware, though malware that works in this way is far rarer than it used to be. It's far more effective for a spammer to hire the services of a bot herder nowadays, and malware that manages to infect your system doesn't have to use your mail account or client software to send spam, scams and malware on to other victims.

There are also many ways to disguise a harmful link so that it looks like something quite different, whether it's in email, chat or whatever. The disguising of malicious links in phishing emails so that they appear to go to a legitimate site has obliged developers to reengineer browsers to make it easier to spot such spoofing.

However, too many people forget to make use of elementary precautions such as passing the mouse cursor over the link so that the real link shows up. In any case, it's not always easy to tell a genuine or fake site just from the URL, even if the URL is rendered correctly. (Early phishing emails tended to rely on exploiting bugs in popular browsers to hide the real target link.) DNS cache poisoning, for instance, allows an attacker to redirect a web query to an IP address under his control.

6. Social networks can be very anti-social

Don't disclose sensitive information on web sites like Facebook or LinkedIn if you can't be sure that you can limit access to those data. Even information that in itself is innocuous can be combined with other harmless information and used in social engineering attacks.

In 2010, it's more than likely that we'll see increased targeting of social networks, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter in the U.S., and Orkut and Hi5 in South America. Attackers will be looking for data they can exploit from a social engineering standpoint, but they'll also be looking for cross-site scripting and replicable malware attacks on the web sites as well as their APIs (Application Programming Interfaces).

Data mining (both legitimate and criminal) will have a wider range of effects on individuals, and some of those effects will be far from beneficial. A notable example is Facebook's lack of commitment to a realistic security model, which would be a very significant supplement to its rather generic security center advice. It seems to me that Facebook is encouraging its users to share as much information as possible, while essentially making them responsible for the security of their own data. This isn't unique to Facebook, of course, or even to Web 2.0 providers in general. But some such services are grooming us to accept that it's legitimate for an ever-wider pool of data to be used to monitor our behavior. It's becoming harder to distinguish between appropriate and illicit use of personal data, in terms of targeting both advertised content and services, and of monitoring for security purposes by financial and governmental institutions, for instance. Lines are sometimes very blurred between legitimate and criminal data mining in some of these areas, and there are questions to be asked about validation: see <http://www.eset.com/threat-center/blog/2009/12/14/your-data-and-your-credit-card>.

Privacy tends to diminish where it's in the way of commercial rather than political interests. So, ironically enough, there will be particular and ongoing interest in data leakage where it affects public bodies, but selling of information at the backdoor by more or less legal means will continue as it always has, though it's starting to attract some attention. This may be less true in Europe, where data protection and other directives already give some formal weight to the principle that organizations should only hold as much personal data as they need, rather than what they want. On the other hand, the libertarian lobby in the U.S. may eventually take more notice of this issue, and its potential influence is considerable.

7. Call for backup

If sensitive information is stored on your hard drive (and if you don't have *something* worth protecting on your system, you're probably not reading this paper), protect it with encryption.

Furthermore, when you copy or move data elsewhere, it's usually at least as important to protect/encrypt it when it's on removable media, or transferred electronically. Even if the target storage device is secure from malware or hacking, you also need to be aware of other dangers such as physical risks, transit risks, business-related risks such as an escrow site going out of business and so on.

Consider (seriously) regularly backing up your data to a separate disk (as a bare minimum) and, where possible, a remote site or facility. Sounds extreme? Think about it.

You can't rely on backing up to another partition on the same disk as the original; if the disk dies, the chances are that all partitions will be lost.

You can't rely on backing up to another disk on the same system. If the system is stolen, or there's a fire, for instance, then in the immortal words of Tom Lehrer, they'll "all go together." In the latter instance, the chances are that you'll lose your thumb drives, CD-RWs and so on as well.

And if you're working in a corporate environment, you might want to avoid doing what one site I know of did, and back up data to a server, but forget to back up the server itself.

I'm sure I don't need to remind you to take care of your passwords as well, do I?

8. Antivirus isn't total security

Don't expect antivirus alone to protect you from everything.

Use additional measures such as a personal firewall, antispam and anti-phishing toolbars, but be aware that there is a lot of fake security software out there. This means that you need to take care to invest in reputable security solutions, not malware, which claims to fix nonexistent problems, or toolbars that are designed to divert you away from the sites you want to visit and toward the ones that generate revenue for adware providers.

Apart from that, even the best protection might not protect you as well as common sense and caution do. There is no silver bullet in protection in malware, which is why we always advocate multilayering or defense in depth. Specifically, don't fall for the "I can do anything and click on anything because my antivirus will protect me" trap. There seems to be a temptation for people to cluster at one of two extremes.

- Some people have such touching faith in their AV that they assume it will catch everything malicious that's thrown at their system, so they don't run anything else and are convinced that they don't need to think about their own security. When they eventually find that their system has been infected, whether it's by something they've clicked on incautiously or something a little more subtle like a zero-day vulnerability or a drive-by download, they feel betrayed and angry. That's understandable, but it comes from a misunderstanding of the limitations of all security software. For every technical solution (not just AV), there is at least one way of getting around it.
- Others take the view that antivirus is no use at all because it "only detects malware it already knows about." That isn't the case; only the most primitive modern antimalware relies purely on signatures of known malware variants. Good antimalware products incorporate tools like generic detection, advanced heuristics, sandboxing, whitelisting and so on into an integrated product that catches a high percentage of all malware, not just viruses.

The danger in both scenarios is that the individual is tempted to substitute one partially successful solution for another. (Some marketing departments may overstate the effectiveness of a product, but that isn't a problem restricted to the antimalware industry, or even the security industry!)

The trick is not to rely solely on one solution at all. A diverse spread of partially successful solutions may be more successful... However, note that word diverse. For most people, half a dozen antivirus packages on a single desktop machine are likely to cause more problems than they solve... By multilayering, I mean using a diversity of product types. Using multiple antivirus products may catch more specific malicious programs, but the increased detection may not be worth the additional strain on resources and risk of program conflicts, false positives and so on.

Also, please bear in mind that malware gangs spend a lot of development time tweaking binaries so that they will evade specific scanners. The more effective a scanner is, the likelier it becomes that it will be targeted in this way. Of course, we monitor these tricks closely and enhance our own detection accordingly, but there is always a risk that such a tweaked binary will reach you before we've received a sample and updated our detection.

For this reason, we're always grateful to receive samples of malware (or indeed false positives) that have evaded our products. For details on how to do this, take a look at: http://training.eset.com/kb/index.php?option=com_kb&Itemid=29&page=articles&articleid=141.

9. Be wireless, not careless

Don't connect to just any "free Wi-Fi" access point; it might alter your DNS queries or be the "evil twin" of a legitimate access point, set up to intercept your logins and online transactions. (When I have occasion to see what networks are being offered me in hotels, airports, even in the apartment block where I live, I have to wonder how many of them are legitimate...)

Our colleagues in Bratislava put up a useful article this summer on "Summer Surfing on Free Wi-Fi: Work or Play, but stay secured" (see <http://www.eset.eu/press/summer-surfing-on-free-wifi>). Of course, many of the points made there are just as valid at any time of year. Here's a summary of some of them:

Be aware of some common security issues with hot spots:

- "Evil twin" login interception, a scenario where a network is set up by hackers to resemble legitimate Wi-Fi hot spots, in order to intercept your login credentials for legitimate networks and sites
- Previously unknown (zero-day) attacks exploiting operating system or application vulnerabilities.
- Sniffing, or using computer software and/or hardware to intercept and monitor traffic passing over a network.
- Other forms of data leakage using man-in-the-middle attacks.

Also be aware of ways to reduce your attack surface and protect your computer:

- Ensure VPN pass-through ports are enabled, but don't allow a high port free-for-all; professional system administrators open only necessary ports. This doesn't stop all attacks, but it does reduce them.
- Use HTTPS to access webmail.
- Avoid protocols that don't include encryption wherever possible.
- Disable sharing of files, folders, services.
- Avoid connecting to sites that transfer sensitive data, your banking information, for instance, when connected to an untrusted access point.
- Ensure you're using sound firewalling, antimalware, HIPS and so on.

10. Don't be a crackhead

Don't use cracked/pirated software. Such programs provide an easy avenue for introducing malware into (or exploiting weaknesses in) a system. The illegal P2P (peer-to-peer) distribution of copyrighted audio and video files is dangerous. Some of these are counterfeited or modified so that they can be used directly in the malware distribution process.

Even if a utility seems to come from a trusted and trustworthy source rather than Mrs. Miggins' Warez Emporium, it pays to verify as best you can that it's genuine.

Win32/GetCodec.A, which is as common now as it was a year ago, is a type of malware that modifies media files. This Trojan converts all audio files found on a computer to the WMA format and adds a field to the header that includes a URL pointing the user to malicious content, claiming that the fake "codec" has to be downloaded so that the media file can be read.

WMA/TrojanDownloader.GetCodec.Gen is a downloader that facilitates infection by GetCodec variants like Win32/GetCodec.A.

Passing off a malicious file as a new video codec is a long-standing social engineering technique exploited by many malware authors and distributors. The victim is tricked into running malicious code he believes will do something useful or interesting. While there's no simple, universal test to indicate whether what appears to be a new codec is a genuine enhancement or a Trojan horse of some sort, we would encourage you to be cautious and skeptical about any unsolicited invitation to download a new utility. Even if the utility seems to come from a trusted site (see <http://www.eset.com/threat-center/blog/?p=828>, for example), it pays to verify as best you can that it's genuine.



advanced
network
systems

For More Information,
Contact Us:

800.639.6757
sales@getadvanced.net

www.getadvanced.net